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ETERNITY, TIME AND TENSELESSNESS 
Delmas Lewis 
In this paper I argue that the classic concept of eternity, as it is presented in Boethius, 
Anselm and Aquinas, must be understood to involve not only the claim that all temporal 
things are epistemically present to God, but also the claim that all temporal things are 
existentially present to God insofar as they coexist timelessly in the eternal present. I 
further argue that the concept of eternity requires a tenseless view of time. If this is 
correct then the existence of an eternal God logically depends on the truth of the tenseless 
account of time. I conclude by suggesting that the Christian theologian ought to reject a 
tenseless ontology. 
The classic concept of eternity is essentially Neoplatonist, deriving from Plotinus, 
and ultimately from Plato and Parmenides. I Although it may be found in Augus-
tine,2 it was principally Boethius who transmitted it to the Christian middle ages, 
and provided subsequent Christian theologians with the canonical definition of 
eternity. In Book V, Prove VI of The Consolation of Philosophy, he writes: 
Eternity therefore is the complete possession all at once of illimitable 
life (interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio), which becomes 
clearer through a comparison with temporal things. For whatever lives 
in time progresses as something present from what is past to what is 
future, and there is nothing placed in time which can embrace (possit 
amplecti) the whole extent of its life equally (totum vitae suae spatium 
pariter). It does not yet grasp tomorrow, and it has already lost yesterday. 
Even in today's life you do not live more than in the moving and 
transitory moment. So what is subject to the condition of time is not 
yet such as is rightly to be judged eternal, even if, as Aristotle believed 
of the world, it never began to exist, and does not cease, but has its 
life stretched out with the infinity of time. For even if its life is infinite, 
it does not include (comprehendit) and encompass (complectitur) the 
whole extent of that life all at once (totum simul), since it does not 
possess the future and it already lacks the past. So that which embraces 
and possesses equally the whole completeness (plenitudinem totam par-
iter) of illimitable life, and for which there is not some of the future 
missing nor some of the past elapsed-that is rightly held to be eternal. 
And it must be in possession of itself and always present to itself, and 
must have present to itself the infinity of moving time. 3 
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Boethius's definition appeals to the kind of life God possesses-it is illimitable 
or boundless-and to the way in which God possesses it--completely and all at 
once. These putative facts about divine existence are the essential ingredients 
from which the concept of eternity is constructed and by which it is justified. 
The central features of this concept may be discerned by taking a closer look at 
each part of the Boethian definition. 
Consider, first, the claim that the life of God, and so God himself, is illimitable. 
This already distinguishes God's manner of existence from all of those temporal 
things that have a beginning and an end. For many, if not most, temporal things, 
there was a time before they came to exist and there will be a time after they 
cease to exist. Hence, their existence may be said to be limited in that it does 
not extend to times before their beginning or after their end. And anything whose 
existence has such temporal boundaries does not in a certain sense have unlimited 
existence. Therefore, eternity must be beginningless and endless, because it 
involves the possession of illimitable life. 
It might be thought that by itself the attribution of illimitable life to God in 
Boethius's definition does not exclude the possibility that God is everlasting, 
i.e., that he exists throughout an infinite duration of time without beginning or 
end. I think this would be a mistake, for the following reasons. First, there is 
the fact that the events in the lives of most temporal things themselves begin 
and end, such that the life of that thing at any time may be said to be limited 
to only those events that are occurring in its life at that time. This will be true 
even if the life of the thing itself has no beginning or end. So there will be a 
real sense in which the life of any temporal thing whatever--even an everlasting 
one-may be said to be limited. Second, given Boethius's familiarity with the 
Aristotelian corpus, I think it unlikely that he did not have Aristotle's discussions 
of time in mind when he framed his definition of eternity. And there is explicit 
reference to boundaries in Aristotle's definition of time. In the Physics Aristotle 
writes: 
We recognize time when we set boundaries to motion, bounding it by 
before and after. And we say that time has elapsed when we take notice 
of the before and after in motion. We set boundaries by taking the 
before and after as different and as having something distinct between 
them. For when we notice that the ends are different from what is in 
the middle, and the mind says that the nows are two, one before and 
one after, we say that there is time then and that this is time: let that 
be taken as given. When, therefore, we perceive the now as one, and 
not as one before and one after in motion, or when we perceive it as a 
single terminus, albeit a terminus of what comes before and after, then 
no time is thought to have occurred, because no motion. But when we 
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perceive a before and after, then we say that there is time. For this is 
what time is: the number of motion in respect of before and after. 4 
Aristotle extends the definition of time such that the before and after are under-
stood in relation to any kind of change: 
Someone might be puzzled as to the sort of change for which time is 
the number. Is it not change of any sort? For things come into being 
and perish and grow and change quality and move, all in time. So time 
is the number of each change in so far as it is a change; which is why 
it is the number of continuous change quite generally, and not of a 
particular of change. 5 
It is worth noting that Aquinas cites Aristotle's definition of time in defending 
and explaining Boethius's definition of eternity.6 Focusing on Aristotle's defini-
tion puts the attribution of illimitable life to God in a new light, for it suggests 
that there can be no before and after in as well as around a truly illimitable life, 
because this would subject that life to boundaries. But such a life cannot exist 
in time, for no temporal distinctions can apply to it-it cannot be before or after 
anything else, and nothing in it can be before or after anything else in it. It must 
therefore exist outside of time. Further, if there is no before or after in its life, 
there is also no change. Hence, a timeless life must also be immutable. In sum, 
the appeal to illimitability in Boethius's definition by itself may be understood 
to require that God exist outside of time. Even if this were not so, the rest of 
the definition allows no doubt with respect to the timelessness of God. 
Let us consider, then, the claim that the illimitable life of God is complete 
and all at once. This should be understood in contrast to the successiveness 
intrinsic to time: the present moment never remains but inexorably recedes into 
the past as the future becomes present. (Note that this last sentence-following 
Boethius-presupposes the reality of temporal becoming.) As a result, no tem-
poral thing can be said to possess all of its life at once, because the events 
comprised by that life occur in sequence-past events it no longer possesses and 
future events it does not yet possess. Indeed, this will be true of the life of any 
temporally extended thing whatever, including one that is everlasting. But there 
can be no succession in the life of an eternal thing, for succession involves the 
acquisition of something new-some new event or property-which contradicts 
the claim that this thing possesses its life completely and all at once. Of course, 
if there can be no succession in the life of God, then neither can there be change, 
for change requires succession. 
The absence of succession in the life of God has as a consequence that the 
life of God lacks temporal duration. God is not temporally extended, because 
such duration can only come about by persistence through successive moments 
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of time. It would seem that this life must also lack temporal location, since to 
have temporal duration is just to occupy successive temporal positions. Anselm, 
endorsing Boethius, makes this implication explicit: 
[The Supreme Being] is in every place and time because it is absent 
from none; it is in no place or time because it has no place or time. It 
does not receive into itself distinctions of space and time-as, for exam-
ple, here and there or somewhere, or now or then or sometime. Nor 
does it exist in the fleeting temporal present which we experience, nor 
did it exist in the past, nor will it exist in the future. For these are 
distinguishing properties of finite and mutable things; but it is neither 
finite nor mutable. 7 
The upshot is that God must exist altogether outside of time, as Anselm declares 
in Chapter XIX of the Proslogion: 
But if through Your eternity You have been and are and will be, and 
if to have been is not to be in the future, and to be present is not to 
have been or to be in the future-how does Your eternity exist as a 
whole always? Or is there nothing past in Your eternity so that it is no 
longer; nor anything future, as though it were not already? You were 
not, therefore, yesterday, nor will you be tomorrow, but yesterday and 
today and tomorrow you are. Indeed you exist neither yesterday nor 
today nor tomorrow but are absolutely outside all time. For yesterday 
and today and tomorrow are completely in time. 8 
To summarize: the ascription of timelessness to God lies at the heart of the 
classic concept of eternity. Thus God, if eternal, bears no temporal relations to 
any object or event whatever. It cannot be said that God exists now, for this 
would assign him a position in the temporal series, which he cannot have. Strictly 
speaking, then, it cannot be said that God did exist in the past or will exist in 
the future, because he does not exist pastly or futurely: he simply exists in the 
timeless mode of existence peculiar to an eternal thing.9 
II 
So much by way of introductory remarks on the concept of eternity. In this 
section I want to focus on the idea that God exists in an "eternal present" and 
that all temporal things are "present to" God in the eternal present. In his book 
God and Timelessness, Nelson Pike suggests that when Boethius says that tem-
poral objects and events are present to God, Boethius is only making the epis-
temological point that God is aware of the temporal objects and events in ques-
tion. 10 Yet in the passage quoted above, Boethius says that what is eternal "must 
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be in possession of itself and always present to itself, and must have present to 
itself the infinity of moving time." Is the point here merely epistemological? 
Perhaps, but not clearly so. The Latin adjective praesens, like the English 
"present" derived from it, is ambiguous between a locative sense of existing 
alongside or with something and the epistemological sense of registering to the 
awareness of someone. So which sense does Boethius intend? 
Boethius provides help several pages later in The Consolation of Philosophy: II 
Since then every act of judging encompasses those things subject to it 
according to its own nature, and God has an always eternal and present 
state, then his knowledge too, overstepping (supergressa) all movement 
of time, abides in the simplicity of his present, and encompassing (com-
plectens) all the infinite spaces of the future and the past, beholds 
(considerat) them in his simple act of cognition just as they are then 
occurring (quasi iam geruntur). 
And if the comparison of the divine and the human present is a proper 
one, just as you see certain things in this your temporal present, in the 
same manner he perceives (cemit) all things in his eternal one. 
The suggestion is that God beholds all times, and what is occurring at those 
times, because his knowledge, like the eternal present in which he exists, encom-
passes all times. The point is epistemological, but its justification is metaphysical: 
all temporal things and events are present to God (meaning: they are objects of 
his awareness) in the eternal present because they are present to God (meaning: 
they are coexistent with God) in the all-encompassing eternal present. This 
interpretation is supported by Boethius' s comparison of the temporal and eternal 
present. If God beholds things in the eternal present in the same way that we 
see things in our temporal present, then things exist before and along with him 
in the eternal present just as things exist before and along with us in the temporal 
present. 
That God's eternal present should be understood in this fashion is corroborated 
by Anselm's discussion of eternity in his treatise on the freedom of the will: 
For within eternity a thing has no past or future but only a present; yet, 
without inconsistency, in the dimension of time this thing was and will 
be . . . However, although within eternity there is only a present, 
nonetheless it is not the temporal present, as is ours, but is an eternal 
present in which the whole of time is contained. For, indeed, just as 
present time encompasses every place and whatever is in any place, so 
in the eternal present the whole of time is encompassed at once, as well 
as whatever occurs at any time. Therefore, when the apostle says that 
ETERNITY, TIME AND TENSELESSNESS 
God foreknew, predestined, called, justified, and glorified his saints, 
none of these actions is earlier or later for God; rather everything must 
be understood to exist at once in an eternal present. For eternity has its 
own "simultaneity" wherein exist all things that occur at the same time 
and place and that occur at different times and places. 12 
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This passage makes clear that the presence of temporal things and events to 
eternity cannot be reduced to a mere fact about God's awareness. Indeed, the 
passage is decidedly metaphysical in tone, and contains no hint of epistemological 
concerns. 
Anselm is trying to explain why the actions of God do not stand in the relations 
of earlier or later to temporal events. They do not, he says, because the eternal 
present contains the whole of time. He supports this somewhat surprising assertion 
with an analogy: the eternal present is related to the whole of time in the same 
way that the temporal present is related to the whole of space. Hence, just as, 
without inconsistency, all spatial objects and events, although in different places, 
exist at once in the present moment of time, so all temporal objects and events-
past, present, and future---exist at once in the eternal present. So God's actions 
cannot be earlier or later than any temporal event. 
Yet this is not the only point that can be gleaned from Anselm's analogy. It 
also illustrates how a timeless God can exist with temporal things and events in 
the eternal present even though time and eternity are considered distinct modes 
of existence. Let us assume that an object is entirely temporal if and only if it 
has temporal location and is spaceless, where an object is spaceless if and only 
if it bears no spatial relations to any object or event in space. A Cartesian mind 
is a good example of such an object. Clearly, an entirely temporal object may 
coexist with spatial objects in the temporal present, and yet remain spaceless. 
Likewise, according to Anselm, a wholly eternal God may coexist with temporal 
objects in the eternal present, and yet remain timeless." At the same time, so 
to speak, temporal objects and events may "coexist" with God in the eternal 
present without threat to their temporality. Just as the present moment encom-
passes all of space without being spatial, the eternal present encompasses all of 
time without being temporal. 14 
The analogy is not yet squeezed dry. Suppose with Anselm that, for any object 
X, at any time T which happens to be present, X exists in space at T only if X 
exists in the temporal present. The reverse entailment does not hold, as is shown 
by the notion of an entirely temporal object. Something may exist in time without 
existing in space. Likewise, pursuing the analogy, X exists in the temporal 
present at T only if X exists in the eternal present. But, again, the reverse 
entailment does not hold. God exists in the eternal present but not in the temporal 
present. Furthermore, all temporal things and events exist in the eternal present 
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but not all of them exist at the present moment of time, although, of course, all 
of them exist in some moment of time. Still, a defender of Anselm might argue, 
there is no need to introduce a new sense of "exist" to explain the different way 
in which spatial objects exist in time; they simply exist in the temporal present 
in virtue of the fact that they exist in space. Similarly, one might argue, there 
is no need to introduce a new sense of "exist" to explain the different way in 
which temporal objects exist in eternity; they simply exist in the eternal present 
in virtue of the fact that they exist in time. 
However, the explanatory force of this "spatial containment" analogy is pur-
chased at a certain metaphysical price. Time and space msut be sufficiently similar 
in order to float the analogy. Anselm is obviously thinking of time and space 
as extended continua that can be divided into intervals or parts. But this similarity 
alone is not enough for the analogy to do its work. For spatially distant objects 
may be said to exist in exactly the same sense in which spatially present objects 
are said to exist. With respect to existence, things far away in space are on an 
equal footing with things nearby. It is for this reason that we ordinarily feel no 
reservations about saying that all spatial objects exist at once in the temporal 
present. If Anselm's analogy is to play the explanatory role assigned to it, then 
temporal concepts must operate in the same way with respect to existence. That 
is, temporally distant objects~bjects in the distant past or distant future, for 
example-must be on an equal ontological footing with objects in the temporal 
present. With respect to existence, past, present, and future things must "coexist" 
altogether and in the same way. Only then can all objects in time exist in the 
eternal present in the same way that all spatial objects exist in the temporal 
present-i.e., coexist at once. 
An interesting consequence of the view that all temporal things and events 
coexist with God in the eternal present is that they all thereby have an eternal, 
and so timeless, mode of existence. Whatever exists temporally must also exist 
along with God in the eternal present. Anselm expressly recognizes this unavoid-
able implication. IS As remarked above, this does not imply that temporal things 
and events are not genuinely temporal, any more than the proposition that spatial 
objects have a temporal, and so spaceless, mode of existence implies that they 
are not genuinely spatial. Of course, only God has a purely eternal mode of 
existence, for only he exists wholly outside of time. However, just as a spatially 
extended object and its spatially distant parts may exist all at once in the temporal 
present, so a temporally extended object and the temporally distant parts of its 
history may exist all at once in the eternal present. 
In Question II, Article 12 of De Veritate,'6 Aquinas discusses the relation of 
God's act of cognition to its objects. He says that something is known as future 
when there is a relation of past and future between the cognitive act of the 
knower and the occurrence of the thing. But this relation cannot exist between 
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the divine act of cognition and any event, because the relation of the divine act 
of cognition to any thing whatever, Aquinas contends, is like that of "present 
to present" (sicut ordo praesentis ad presens). Aquinas explains this relation 
with an analogy. We are to imagine someone who sees in succession many 
persons walking down a road during a given period of time. At different moments 
this observer would see some of those walking past as present such that in the 
entire period of his act of seeing, all the passers-by would be seen by him as 
present. Yet he would not see them altogether present since the time in which 
he sees them is not all at once. However, if his diachronic act of seeing could 
exist all at once, he would see all of the passers-by present at once, even though 
they would not walk past at once. What is impossible for a temporal observer 
is accomplished by God in eternity: 
Therefore, since the act of seeing (visio) of divine knowledge is measured 
by eternity, which is all at once (tota simuf), and yet contains (includit) 
the whole of time and is not absent from any part of time, it follows 
that he sees whatever occurs in time, not as future, but as present. 
Indeed, that which is seen by God is future to another thing, which it 
succeeds in time; but to the divine act of seeing itself, which is not in 
time but outside of time, it is not future, but present. Therefore, we 
see what is future as future, because it is future to our act of seeing, 
since our act of seeing is measured by time;; but to the divine act of 
seeing, which is outside of time, it is not future. In the same fashion, 
one who is among the ranks of the passers-by and who sees only those 
ahead of him, sees the passers-by in a different way than someone 
outside the ranks of the passers-by who looks at all of the passers-by 
at once. 17 
The important point in this passage is that Aquinas assumes that past and future 
things are "there" to be directly seen by an eternal being with the requisite visual 
capacity, even though we cannot see them. 
Book I, Chapter 66 of the Summa contra Gentiles is devoted to the question 
whether God knows things which do not exist. There Aquinas develops Boethius' s 
suggestion l8 that the relation between time and eternity is analogous to that 
between the circumference and the center of a circle: 
For a designated point on the circumference, although it is an indivisible, 
does not coexist together with another point as regards position since 
it is the order of position that produces the continuity of the circumfer-
ence. But the center, which is outside the circumference, is directly 
opposite any designated point on the circumference. In this way whatever 
is in any part of time coexists with what is eternal as being present to 
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it even though past or future with respect to another part of time. But 
nothing can coexist with what is eternal in its presentness except as a 
whole, for it does not have the duration of succession. And so in its 
eternity the divine understanding perceives as present whatever takes 
place during the whole course of time. It is not the case, however, that 
what takes place in a certain part of time has been existent always. It 
remains, therefore, that God has knowledge of those things that, as 
regards the course of time, are not yet. 1Q 
This spatial analogy reveals that Aquinas, like Anselm, conceives of time 
primarily as a linear continuum, such that different instants of time are strictly 
analogous to points on a line. Thus, existence at a particular moment of time is 
analogous to location at a point on the circle's circumference. The analogy further 
illustrates that it is on account of their coexistence with God in the eternal present 
that God beholds all temporal objects and events. 
As with Anselm's analogy of spatial containment, the explanatory force of 
Aquinas's analogy is purchased at a certain metaphysical price. 20 It is only 
because all of the points on the circumference exist altogether and in the same 
way that each may be related in the same way to the center. Of course, with 
respect to location, the points on the circumference differ. But with respect to 
existence, all of the points on the circumference are on an equal ontological 
footing. If time is related to eternity just as the circumference is related to the 
center of a circle, then all temporal things-past, present, and future-are on a 
par ontologicalIy, because they all exist timelessly in the eternal present. It does 
not follow that all temporal objects and events are on an equal ontological footing 
with respect to anyone moment of time-for example, that they coexist now-for 
this would contravene the fact that they occupy different positions in the temporal 
series. Nor does it follow that all temporal objects and events exist always, for 
even though they and every moment of time exist in the eternal present, they 
do not all exist at every moment of time. What does follow is that all temporal 
objects and events coexist timelessly in the eternal present. Aquinas is in complete 
agreement with Boethius and Anselm with regard to this implication of the 
concept of eterni ty. 21 
If the above interpretation of the concept of eternity is accurate, then Eleonore 
Stump and Norman Kretzmann's explanation of the way in which something 
eternal is present to something temporal is mistaken. 22 They analyze this present-
ness in terms of a simultaneity relationship, which they call ET-simultaneity (for 
"eternal-temporal simultaneity"). They begin by rejecting the suggestion that 
ET-simultaneity is a two-term relation between an eternal entity and temporal 
objects and events. They offer the following argument: 
But on the view we are explaining and defending, it is theoretically 
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impossible to specify a single mode of existence for two relata of which 
one is eternal and the other temporal. To do so would be to reduce what 
is temporal to what is eternal (thus making time illusory) or what is 
eternal to what is temporal (thus making eternity illusory) or both what 
is temporal and what is eternal to some third mode of existence; and 
all three of these alternati ves are ruled out. 23 
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If the line of reasoning in this passage is correct, then it follows that temporal 
things and events cannot be existentially present to (i.e., exist in the same mode 
of existence with) an eternal God. 24 
I have argued at length that the concept of eternity as found in Boethius, 
Anselm, and Aquinas involves this very relation of existential presentness. If 
we concentrate on the spatial containment analogy used by Anselm to clarify 
and justify the notion of the eternal present, it will become clear that Stump and 
Kretzmann's objection is unwarranted. Recall that the eternal present is supposed 
to be related to all objects and events in time just as the temporal present is 
related to all objects and events in space. Now consider the following claim: "It 
is theoretically impossible to specify a single mode of existence for two relata 
of which one is temporal and the other spatial." This is plainly false, even though 
time and space may be understood as two equally real modes of existence, neither 
of which is reducible to the other, nor can they both be reduced to some third 
mode of existence. Existing spatially is not necessarily the same as existing 
temporally. We can specify a single mode of existence for a nonspatial, temporal 
thing and a spatial thing-namely, time. That is, a purely temporal thing and a 
spatial thing both exist in time, although they do not both exist in space. If this 
is admitted, it certainly does not follow that we have reduced space to time or 
time to space, or that either space or time is illusory. Likewise, as we have seen, 
temporal things and events are said to coexist with God in the eternal present 
without threat to their temporality. But this is just to say that all temporal things 
have an eternal mode of existence-they exist along with God in the eternal 
present. 
III 
We are now in a position to see how the concept of eternity is allied with a 
particular philosophical view of time. The most important question about time 
has to do with the reality of tense. Philosophers throughout history have divided 
into two camps over this issue. On the one side are those who hold what may 
be called a tenseless theory of time. On this view, the distinction between past, 
present, and future, as Genevieve Lloyd puts it, "is an epistemological accretion 
which infects our perception of the world"25 but is in no way essential to a 
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complete understanding of reality. Since it denies the reality of tense, I will call 
this the anti-realistic theory of tense, and its adherents simply anti-realists. 
McTaggart believed that anti-realism about tense amounts to anti-realism about 
time, but most philosophers who deny the reality of tense do not thereby intend 
to deny the reality of time. According to anti-realists, "the present is an epis-
temological/subjective notion reflecting our limited knowledge at any time of a 
temporally extended reality, just as where we are limits our knowledge of distant 
objects. "26 A. J. Ayer endorses the anti-realistic view when he writes that 
... events are not in themselves either past, present or future. In them-
selves they stand in relations of temporal precedence which do not vary 
with time ... What varies is only the point of reference which is taken 
to constitute the present, ... the point of reference, by which we orient 
ourselves in time, the point of reference which is implied by our use 
of tenses, is continuously shifted. 27 
According to anti-realists regarding tense, all temporal things-past, present, 
and future-are on an equal ontological footing with respect to existence. 
In the other camp are philosophers who believe that tense is essential to a 
complete understanding of reality, and that the distinction between past, present, 
and future signifies a real, irreducible feature of things. Since this view holds 
that tense is real, I will call it the realistic theory of tense, and its adherents 
simply realists about tense. On this view, past and future things are considered 
not to exist at all in the sense in which present things are now existing, such 
that things past and future cannot be on an equal ontological footing with things 
present. 
In the eternal present in which God beholds all of temporal reality, there is 
no contrast between past, present, and future with respect to existence. This 
alone suffices to show that the concept of eternity presupposes a tenseless view 
of time. If the claim that all temporal things are metaphysically present to God 
in eternity is combined with certain plausible assumptions about God (assumptions 
which Boethius, Anselm and Aquinas, at any rate, clearly accept), then an even 
stronger argument can be marshalled for the conclusion that God's eternity 
precludes the reality of tense. 
Let us assume with these theologians that God's view of things must be the 
correct view. Since God is unaware of an objective nonrelational difference 
between the existence of things present and the existence of things past and 
future, there is no such difference as there appears to be from our perspective 
in time. Otherwise, God does not apprehend temporal things and events as they 
truly are, i.e., God has a false or inaccurate picture of temporal reality. Yet God 
is omniscient, and his knowledge is perfect and complete. Hence, if God is 
eternal, then the present does not differ with respect to existence from the past 
ETERNITY, TIME AND TENSELESSNESS 83 
and the future, and the tenseless view of time is correct. 2X 
I doubt whether this implication of the doctrine of divine eternality was ever 
recognized by Boethius, Anselm or Aquinas. In fact, these theologians seem to 
appeal to the reality of tense in order to justify the a priori need for divine 
timelessness. Boethius writes of "the moving and transitory present"; Anselm 
of "the fleeting temporal moment"; the Aquinas of contingent events which 
"come into actual existence successively. "29 However, if it is necessary to presup-
pose the reality of tense in order to understand the a priori need for divine 
timelessness, then there arises a curious logical and practical dilemma for any 
philosopher or theologian who wishes to defend the doctrine along a priorist 
lines. In order to concede the force of at least some of the a priori considerations 
which motivate the doctrine of divine eternality, a philosopher must reject the 
tenseless account of time. However, a philosopher cannot accept the doctrine 
without thereby committing himself to the truth of the tenseless account. 
IV 
The upshot of this discussion is that the existence of an eternal God logically 
depends on the truth of the tenseless account of time. This point is not a new 
one, although it has been curiously overlooked in recent discussions. Duns Scotus 
long ago recognized that the Boethian concept of eternity presupposes an under-
standing of time and existence which makes sense only if anti-realism about 
tense is correct, and objected to Aquinas's account of God's relation to temporal 
things on the grounds that things past and future are not onto logically on a par 
with things present. 30 
A full discussion of the plausibility of a tenseless ontology lies outside the 
ambit of this paper. However, there is good reason to doubt that a tenseless 
ontology is a live option for the Christian theologian. For Christianity is at its 
heart a moral religion, and makes no sense unless certain presuppositions about 
human nature and human action are true. If Christian theism is true, then human 
persons must minimally be the sorts of things that are susceptible to divine 
judgment and forgiveness; they must be moral agents. I have argued elsewhere 
that the only things to which responsibility could be assigned on a tenseless 
account of persons do not appear to be the sort of things to which responsibility 
is assignable. 31 Hence, there is good reason to think that human persons on the 
tenseless view cannot be moral agents, since moral agents are necessarily the 
sort of beings to which responsibility is assignable. 
If this conclusion is correct, then there is no reconciling the doctrine of divine 
etemality with the central anthropological claims of Christian theology. The 
claim that God is eternal may well be a coherent piece of philosophical theology. 
It remains to be shown that it is a coherent piece of Christian theology. 
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